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^801) 363-9057 
^ui bcontract Agreement 
Consisting of this form and attachment "A" 
Trade Treat Sys/Mech 
Job No. 8 4 2 - 1 5 0 0 - S 
Job Name 
THIS AGREEMENT made a t . 
by and between Interwest Construction Inc., 
A . H . 
Salt Lake City 
.Utah. t h i s . 1 s t _ day of _ 
Thlokol M-705 
December ^
 9 88 
hereinafter referred to as the Contractor, and . 
Pa lmer & Sons 
PL0. Box_905 
Logan', "UT "84321 ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 4 8 1 4 
An independent Contractor In fact, hereinafter referred to as the Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators. 
successors, and assigns jointly and severally firmly by these presents. 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and the Subcontractor agree as follows: 
1. SCOPE OF WORK 
That the work to be performed by the Subcontractor under the terms of this agreement consists of the following: 
Furnishing of all labor and material, tools, implements, equipment, scaffolding, permits, fees, etc., to do all of the following: 
Construction of the Strategic Waste Wa ter T^eajtmenit_PIant_7_M_il05 
project as per plans and spec if_i cat Ions and general _cond_itjons prepared 
"by Sverdrup Corporation dated" 9/15/88" Including addenda_#_l (1_1 /10/88 ) _ 
and addenda #2 (11 /11 /88 j for __the__fp 11 ow 1 ng_scope , of..work; DIvi s i on 
11000-Treatment System; Less section 11040; Division i5o6o-Mechanica1, 
less Section 15700-Flreprotectlon; Section 2740-Septic Systems; Section 
2550-Slte Utilities; Section 10200-Louvers & Vents; Alternate A 
ATt: If accepted deduct $31,328.00 for Tax"Exemption 
Davis Bacon Act applies 
A construction schedule will become Attachment "B" of this contract. 
Construction schedule requires a six day work week and a minimum of 
twelve hours per day & priority delivery schedules. 
letter is a part of this contract. 
The attached 
Subcontractor shall start no later than . 
than ( a s d i r e c t e d ) 
(as directed) . and complete his work no later 
in strict accordance with the plans, specifications, and addenda as prepared by S v e r d r u p C o r p / M o r t o n T h l o k o l 
. Architect and/or Engineer, for the construction o f . 
M-705 Strategic Waste Water Treatment Plant 
Morton Thlokol, Inc. 
_, Owner, for For . 
which construction, the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner; together with all addenda or authorized changes issued prior 
to the date of execution of this agreement. 
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree to be bound by the terms of the prime contract agreement, construction regulations, 
general and special conditions, plans and specifications, and all other contract documents, if any there be, insofar as applicable to this 
subcontract agreement, and to that portion of the work herein described to be performed by the Subcontractor. 
In the event of any doubt arising between the Contractor and the Subcontractor with respect to the plans and specifications the 
decision of the Architect and/or Engineer shall be conclusive and binding. Should there be no supervising architect over the work, then 
the matter in question shall be determined as provided in Section 8 of this agreement. 
2. PAYMENTS 
'wnm i^ iTOe* « r %T mw*ms tmrnm^v® «WMW!P %m f the-berein described work tbfi sum nf .. a r s 
1T555;900\00 
in monthly payments of - ~5Cr .% of the work performed In any preceding month, In accordance with estimates prepared 
0> 
the Subcontractor and as approved by the Contractor and Owner, or Owners Representative, such payments to be made as payments are 
receivea ov tne uontractor irom me Uwner covering the monthly estimates oi the Contractor, including the approved portion of the Sub-
contractor's monthly estimate Approval and payment of Subcontractor's monthly estimate is specifically agreed to not constitute or imply 
acceptance by the Contractor or Owner of any portion of the Subcontractor's work. 
Final payment shall be due when the work described in this subcontract is fully completed and performed in accordance with the 
contiact documents and is satisfactory to the arcrv'.ect. 
Before issuance of the final payment the subcontractor, if required, shall submit evidence satisfactory to the contractor that all pay-
rolls, bills for material and equipment, and all known indebtedness_connected^wi||i the subcontractor's work has been satisfied 
This article 2. PAYMENTS is continued on atla 
^ 
TflECEIVED 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms hereof by 
affixing their signatures hereunto. m f t n 
DEC 2 2 1900
 A > H j PALMER & SONS 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. '. 
(Contractor) _ , , - (Subcontractor). 
iNrcnwsiT <:!)''•'•; i 
Witness fsJl<^Uu>^ 
Dnshh SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT 
Interwest Construction ATTACHMENT ' A" 
2. PAYMENTS (com d) 
In the event the Subcontractor does not submit to the Contractor such monthly estimates prior to the date of submission of the Con 
tractor s monthly estimate then the Contractor shall include in his monthly estimate to the Owner for work performed during the preceding 
month such amount as he shall deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the preceding month and the Subcontractor agrees to 
accept such approved portion thereof as his reo lar monthly payment as described above 
Subcontractor agrees to complete monthly I elease and supplier affidavit forme supplied under separate cover prior to receiving . 
Dayments under this agreement ^ 
Failure to comply with any of the conditions of this agreement constitutes cause for withholding payments until such time as this \) 
condition is corrected to me satisfaction oi the contractor 
The Subcontractor agrees to make good without cost to the Owner or Contractor any and all defects due to faulty workmansh p and i \* 
or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents, and if no such oenod be stipulated in the » \ * 
contract documents, then such guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion of the proiect_ The Subcontractor 
further agrees to execute any special guarantees as provided by terms of the Contract documents prior to final payment 
In the event it appears to the Contractor that the labor material and other bills incurred in the performance of the work are not being 
currently paid the Contractor may take such steps as it deems necessary to assure absolutely that the money paid with any proqress 
payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor material and all other bills incurred in the performance of the work of 
Subcontractor The Contractor may deduct from any amounts due or to become due to the Subcontractor any sum or sums owing by the 
Subcontractor to the Contractor and in the event 61 any bfeacn by the Subcontractor- 01 any provision or Obligation of this SuPcumrain-or 
frytne event of the assertion by other parties ot any claim or lien against the Contractor or Contractor s Surety or the premises ar sing out /\ 
of the Subcontractor s performance of this Contract the Contractor shall have the right but is not required, to retain out of any payments 1 
due or to become due to the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss damage or" 
expense merefrom until me situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the sadsfact on of the Contractor ihesc 
provisions snail be appucaoie even tnougn me subcontractor nas postea a mil payment and penormance uono 
3. PROSECUTION OF WORK, DELAYS, ETC 
The Subcontractor shall prosecute the work undertaken in a prompt and diligent manner whenever such work or any part of it 
becomes available or at such other time or times as the Contractor may direct and so as to promote the general progress of the entire 
construction and shall not by delay or otherwise interfere with or hinder the work of the Contractor or any other Subcontractor and jn 
the event that the Subcontractor neglects and/or fails to supply the necessary supervision labor and or materials tools implements" 
equipment etc in the opinion of the Contractor and/or in the event me suocontractor is unable to perform oecause ot strikes pickeTTrro fL 
or boycotting ot any kind which result in Subcontractor s employee s supplier s or subcontractor s being unable or unwilling to enter on [J 
frTe |OQ ana complete me worn or in the event that me suocontracior or nis men reiuse to worx arter nav nq oeen reouesiea ov tne t o n 
tractor to proceed with the work then the Contractor shall notify the Subcontractor in writing setting forth the deficiency and or delm 
quencv and forty eight hours alter date of such written notice the Contractor shall have the right if he so desires to take over the work of 
the Subcontractor in full and exclude the Subcontractor Irom any further participation n the work covered by this agreement, or. at his 
option the Contractor may take over such portion of the Subcontractor s work as the Contractor shall deem to be in the best interest of the 
Contractor and permit the subcontractor to continue with the remaining portions of the work Whichever method the Contractor might 
elect to pursue the Subcontractor agrees to release to the Contractor for his use only without recourse any materials tools implements 
equipment etc on the site belonging to or in the possession of the Subcontractor for the benefit of the Contractor in completing the 
work covered in this agreement and the Contractor agrees to complete the work to the best of his ability and in the most econom cal 
manner available to him at the time Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing any such portion of the work covered by this agreement 
shall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the terms of this agreement and in the event the total amount due or to 
become due under the terms of this agreement shall be insufficient to cover the costs occurred by the Contractor in completing the work 
then the Subcontractor and his sureties if any shall be bound and liable to the Contractor for the difference 
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work under this contract depend wholly or partially upon the proper 
workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcontractors on the proiecl the 
Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same in writing to the Contractor before pro 
ceeding with his work which is so dependent ana shall allow to the Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such defects and in 
the event he does not so report to the Contractor in writing then it shall be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work 
of others as being satisfactory and he shall be fully responsible thereafter for the satisfactory performance ot the work covered by this 
agreement regardless of the defective work of others 
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor all rubbish and debris resulting from his 
work Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall serve as cause for withholding further payment to Subcontractor until such time as this 
condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor Also he shall clean up to the satisfaction of the inspectors all dirt grease 
marks etc from walls ceilings floors fixtures etc deposited or placed thereon as a result of the execution of this subcontract If the 
Subcontractor refuses or fails to perform this cleaning as directed by the Contractor the Contractor shall have the right and power to 
proceed with the said cleaning and the Subcontractor will on demand repay to the Contractor the actual cost of said labor plus a reason 
able percentage of such cost to cover supervision insurance overhead etc 
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all liquidated damages that may be assessed against and collected 
from the Contractor by the Owner which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor s failure to furnish the materials and perfoim 
the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for herein regardless of the cause from which the delay 
occurred and in addition thereto agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may sustain by 
reason of such delay by the Subcontractor The payment ol such damages shall not release the Subcontractor from his obligation to other 
wise fully perform thus Subcontract 
Whenever it may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or use any por 
tion of the work which has been either partially or fully completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection and acceptance thereof by 
the Owner but such use and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of said work and materials nor of his 
obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which may occur or develop prior to Contractor s 
release from responsibility to the Owner Provided however the Subcontractor shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such 
portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor nor for any damage thereto that is due to or caused by the sole 
negligence of the Contractor during such period of use 
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work property and/or materials until completion and final acceptance of the Contract 
by the Owner and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such acceptance In the event of loss or damage he shall proceed 
promptly to make repairs or replacement of the damaged work property and or materials at his own expense as directed by Ihe Con 
tractor Subcontractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor s 
work property or materials 
It is agreed that the Subcontractor at the option of the Contractor may be considered as disabled from so complying whenever a 
petition in Bankruptcy or the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him 
f J The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor assumes toward the #* 
\{2] Owner ihe Subcontractor shall indemnity the Contractor and the Owner against and save them harmless irom any and all loss damage ^> 
\ j f expenses, costs, and attorney's fees incurred oi suffered on account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of this contracf 
Subcont rac t s'-all pay reasonable and proportionate cost for hoisting services provideu oy Contractor 
4. SURETY BOND 
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish to the Contractor at the Contractor s request and expense a surety bond guaranteeing the 
faithful performance of this agreement and the payment of all labor and material bills in connection with the execution of the work covered 
by this agreement The bond is to be written by a surety company designated or approved by the Contractor and in a form entirely 
satisfactory to the Contractor 
5. PERMITS, LICENSE FEES, TAXES, ETC 
The Subcontractor shall at his own cost and expense apply for and obtain all necessary fees permits and licenses and shall at no 
extra cost to the Contractor conform strictly to the laws building codes and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the 
project is being done insofar as applicable to work covered by this agreement 
Subcontractor is an independent contractor in fact and also within the scope of the United States Internal Revenue Code the Federal 
Social Security Act together with present and future amendments thereto and any and all unemployment insurance laws both Federal 
and of any state or territory and is therefore solely responsible to the Federal State or territorial Governments for all payroll taxes deduc 
tions withholdings and contributions under such laws The compensation payable to Subcontractor as above provided includes all sales 
and use taxes and franchise excise and olher taxes and governmental impositions of all kinds and is not subject to any addition for any 
such taxes or impositions now or hereafter levied 
6. INSURANCE 
The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain workmen s compensation insurance and to comply in all respects with the employ 
ment of labor required by any constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in which the work is performed 
The Subcontractor shall maintain such third party public liability and property damage Insurance including general products and 
automobile liability as will protect it from claims for damages because of bodily injury including death or damages because of injury to or 
loss destruction or loss of use of property which may arise from operations under this agreement whether such operations be by it or its 
The Subcontractor agrees to furnish a complied certificate of insurance issued to interwest Construction Co Inc 
The Subcontractor shall indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against and save them harmless from any and all loss damage 
costs expenses and attorney s fees suffered or incurred on account of any breach of the aforesaid obligations and covenants and any 
other provision or covenant of this subcontract 
Subcontractor shall indemnify save harmless and defend Owner and the Contractor from and against any and all loss damage in 
jury liability and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons and all loss of or damage to property resulting directly or indirectly 
from Subcontractor s performance of this contract regardless of the negligence of Owner or Contractor or their agents or employees 
except where such loss damage Injury liability or claims are the result of active negligence on the part of Owner or Contractor or its 
agents or employees and is not caused or contributed to by an omission to perform some duty also imposed on Subcontractor its agents 
or employees 
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory to Contractor 
shall be maintained at Subcontractor s expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance being supplied by Subcon 
tractor to Contractor) and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor must be notified by ten (10) days written notice 
before cancellation of any such policy In event of threatened cancellation for nonpayment of premium Contractor may pay same for 
Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or subsequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder 
7. CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement and any changes so made in the amount 
of work involved or any other parts of this agreement shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in detail the changes involved 
and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor The Subcontractor agrees to 
proceed with the work as changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work and pending 
any determination of the value thereof 
Subcontractor shall be entitled to receive no extra compensation for extra work or materials or changes of any kind regardless of 
whether the same was ordered by Contractor or any of its representatives unless a change order therefor has been issued in writing by 
Contractor If extra work was ordered by Contractor and Subcontractor performed same but did not receive a written order therefor Sub 
contractor shall be deemed to have waived any claim for extra compensation therefor regardless of any written or verbal protests or 
claims by Subcontractor Subcontractor shall be responsible for any costs incurred by Contractor for changes of any kind made by Sub 
contractor that increase the cost of the work for either the Contractor or other Subcontractors when the Subcontractor proceeds with 
such changes without a written order therefor 
Notwithstanding any other provision if the work for which Subcontractor claims extra compensation is determined by the Owner or 
Architect not to entitle Contractor to a change order or extra compensation then Contractor shall not be liable to Subcontractor for any 
extra compensation for such work (As used In this Subcontract the term Owner includes any representative of Owner and Architect 
includes the Engineer if any ) 
8. DISPUTES 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work the dispute shall be settled in 
the manner provided by the contract documents If none be provided or if there arises any dispute concerning matters In connection with 
this agreement and without the scope of the work then such disputes shall be settled by a ruling of a board of arbitration consisting of 
three members one selected by the Contractor one by the Subcontractor and the third member shall be selected by the first two members 
The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of their selected members respectively but the expenses of the third member 
shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the arbitration in writing The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings 
of any such boards of arbitration finally and without recourse to any court of law 
9. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT 
In the event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor should be terminated prior to its completion then the Con 
tractor and Subcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under this agreement prior to such termination will be 
made as provided by the contract documents if such provision be made or if none such exist by mutual agreement or failing either of 
these methods by arbitration as provided in Section 8 
10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
During the performance of this subcontract the Subcontractor agrees to not discriminate against any employee because of race 
color creed or national origin As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order 10925 of March 6 1961 
as amended by Executive Order 11114 of June 22 1963 The executive orders and the respective regulations are made a part of this 
subcontract by reference 
Subcontractor shall also fully comply with wage hour and Equal Opportunity regulations and shall take vigorous affirmative action 
including the submittal of a written affirmative action program to employ minority employees whenever so required—and is encouraged to 
do so in the absence of such requirements • 
11. TERMS OF, LABOR AGREEMENTS 
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract the Subcontractor is bound and will comply with 
the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor is a party insofar as said labor agreements lawfully 
require subcontractors to be so bound 
12. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Subcontractor agrees not to sublet transfer or assign this agreement or any part thereof without written consent of the Contractor 
As built drawings when required shall be accurately maintained by Subcontractor for his portion of the work and turned over to Con 
tractor in an acceptable manner before final payment is made to Subcontractor 
The Subcontractor agrees to provide his employees with safe appliances and equipment to provide them with a safe place to work 
to perform the work under this contract In a safe manner with high regard for the safety of his employees and others and to comply with 
health and safety provisions and requirements of local state and federal agencies including the Williams Steiger Occupational Safety and 
Health Act and to hold the Contractor harmless for any costs deficiencies fines or damages incurred because of his negligence to comply 
with these regulations acts and procedures 
Subcontract Agreement 
Attachment "A" 
/*'*z?-ae_ 
Signed for Subcontractor 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
R. Roy PALMER and Val W. Palmer, dba 
A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba 
A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures 
Company and fiberglass Structures 
Company, Inc., 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, 
fka Fiberglass Structures Company of S t 
Paul, Inc., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Thiokol Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 940616 
FILED: June 14, 1996 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable Gordon R. Low 
ATTORNEYS: 
Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt 
Lake City, for Interwest Construction 
George W. * Preston, Logan, and Robert T. 
Wallace, Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & 
Sons 
John £. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard 
and Fiberglass Structures 
Anthony B. Quinn, Mary Anne Q. Wood, 
Richard G. Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for 
Thiokol 
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus 
Utah Manufacturers Association 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Following the trial court's entry of judgment 
on a contract dispute in favor of Interwest 
Construction ("Interwest") and A.H. Palmer and 
Sons ("Palmer"), Thiokol Corporation 
("Thiokol") appealed to this court, and we 
poured the appeal to the court of appeals. We 
then granted certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision affirming the trial court 
judgment. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 
P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub 
nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995). Our present review is limited to 
considering whether the court of appeals erred in 
holding (i) that our decision in Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict 
liability arising out of the breach of contractually 
defined obligations; and (ii) that Thiokol waived 
its rights to enforce its contract with Interwest. 
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's 
findings of fact. The trial court initially detailed 
its findings by memorandum decision and then 
by formal findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings. State 
v. A House & 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535 
(Utah 1994).1 
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest 
entered into a contract under which Interwest 
agreed to build a wastewater treatment facility 
for Thiokol. Interwest subsequently 
subcontracted with Palmer for labor and 
materials in connection with the construction of 
the facility. Palmer, in turn, subcontracted with 
Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc. 
("Fiberglass Structures''), for the purchase of 
three fiberglass wastewater storage tanks for the 
facility. Palmer's purchase order required 
Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans 
and specifications unless it obtained prior 
approval to deviate from them. 
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the 
treatment facility designated the fiberglass tanks 
as T32, T33, and T34 and called for the tanks to 
be built in accordance with "applicable 
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national 
voluntary industry standard governing the 
construction of fiberglass tanks. The tanks were 
designed to collect wastewater from four smaller 
tanks located inside the treatment building by 
means of a gravity-feed system. Because the 
tanks inside the building were smaller than the 
three external tanks, the gravity-feed system 
allowed the external tanks to become only 
two-thirds full at maximum. Thiokol approved 
specifications for the tanks indicating that their 
walls would be 1/4 inch thick. 
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated 
fiberglass panels to the treatment facility site. 
The panels were bolted together along vertical 
seams to create each of the three tanks, and the 
tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the 
treatment building. The top of each tank was 
bolted to the sides, and fill pipes were connected 
between the three external and the four internal 
tanks. The three external tanks were completed 
and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial 
test that same day, tank T34 burst along one of 
the vertical seams connecting two of its 
fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2, 
1989, Thiokol inspected the treatment facility 
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and notified Interwest that the facility was 
substantially complete with the exception of a 
few punch-list items, which did not include the 
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other 
two tanks. The same day, Palmer gave Thiokol 
a one-year warranty on all then-installed work. 
Thiokol hired an independent consulting 
engineer to review the cause of tank T34's 
failure, and the consultant recommended that 
Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant 
was concerned about the strength of the tanks' 
vertical panels, among other things, and 
recommended increasing the thickness of the 
panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design, 
to 3/4 inch. However, Thiokors project 
engineer directed the consultant to focus on 
fixing the tanks' seams. Thereafter, Thiokol 
negotiated separately and directly with 
Fiberglass Structures for the repair of tanks T32 
and T33 and replacement of tank T34; Thiokol's 
involvement was such that the trial court 
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures 
"jointly constructed the tanks." Specifications 
for the modified tanks clearly indicated that they 
would have 1/4-inch-thick walls and a safety 
factor of 6. 
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and 
accepted the repaired tanks on the basis of its 
determination that the tanks met its 
specifications. On June 13th, Fiberglass 
Structures gave Thiokol an extended three-year 
warranty at Thiokol's insistence, which 
warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but 
expressly excluded damage resulting from 
modifications to the tanks. Interwest and Palmer 
were minimally, if at all, involved in these 
negotiations. 
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the 
treatment facility. Sometime that month, without 
the knowledge of Interwest, Palmer, or 
Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the 
tanks' filling system from the original 
gravity-feed design to an overhead, 
high-pressure pump feed. 
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured, 
spilling its wastewater contents. The trial court 
found that the pump feed system allowed the 
tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed 
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol 
employee. Given the pumping capacity, there 
was an insufficient opening at the top of the tank 
to allow for the escape of excess wastewater, 
thus causing an uplift pressure which the tank 
was not designed to withstand. The overfilling 
and consequent uplift pressure caused the tank to 
lift up from its concrete base and to split from 
the bottom up along the middle of one of the 
fiberglass panels, not along a seam as was the 
case with tank T34's earlier failure. 
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol 
withheld $200,000 which it owed to Interwest 
on the original contract. That amount included 
$93,653.70 which Interwest owed to Palmer. 
The instant action began when Interwest sued 
Palmer for breach of warranty, negligence, 
indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer then 
filed a third-party complaint against Fiberglass 
Structures, which in turn filed a third-party 
complaint against Thiokol. Interwest later added 
Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery for 
breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
Thiokol eventually counterclaimed against 
Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass Structures for 
breach of contract, breach of express and 
implied warranties, negligence, and strict 
liability. 
After a two-week bench trial, the trial court 
concluded in relevant part that (i) it would not 
address Thiokol's tort claims because the case 
was Entirely controlled by contract"; (ii) the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated 
into the contract so as to specify a particular 
wall thickness or safety factor for the fiberglass 
panels and, therefore, Thiokol could not hold its 
suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with 
a specific wall thickness and safety factor; (iii) 
neither Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass 
Structures failed to comply with the contract in 
any way which caused or resulted in the August 
24th failure of tank T33; (iv) Thiokol failed to 
prove the cause of tank T33's failure and the 
most likely cause was Thiokol's overfilling the 
tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the tanks 
barred its recovery under any of its suppliers' 
warranties. Accordingly, the trial court ordered 
Thiokol to pay Interwest $200,000, ordered 
Interwest to pay Palmer $93,653.70, and 
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals 
affirmed, and Thiokol's petition to this court 
followed. 
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends 
that the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
dismissal of Thiokol's tort claims. In addition, 
Thiokol claims the court of appeals erred in 
holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert 
that the modified tanks should have complied 
with the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol claims 
that each of these issues presents only questions 
of law which this court should review 
nondeferentialfy. See State v. Penay 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's 
tort claims. In its post-trial memorandum 
decision, the trial court refused to address 
Thiokol's negligence and strict liability claims 
because it concluded that the case was uentirely 
controlled by contract." The court of appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that because "the contract 
expressly provided that [Interwest and Palmer] 
were under a duty to design, construct, and 
deliver a product free from defects and suitable 
for the purposes for.which it was to be used," 
their "responsibility in tort is . . . exactly 
co-extensive with their contractual obligations," 
thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest 
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that 
the court of appeals misconstrued our earlier 
decision in Beck as establishing the proposition 
that "if parties arrange rights, duties, and 
obligations under a contract, any cause of action 
for breach of those contractually defined 
obligations, rights, or duties lies in contract, not 
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in tort." Id. (citing Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-800). 
Although we ultimately reach the result that 
ThiokoFs tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokol 
that the court of appeals misapplied our holding 
in Beck. In Beck, we addressed whether an 
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing allowed its insured to sue the 
insurer in tort. We held that ain a first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its insured, 
the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary." Beck, 701 
P.2d at 800. Because we found no independent 
fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance 
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay 
claims, we further held, "Without more, a 
breach of [contractual] implied or express duties 
can give rise only to a cause of action in 
contract, not one in tort." Id. 
Nonetheless, we specifically noted in Beck that 
"in some cases the acts constituting a breach of 
contract may also result in breaches of duty that 
are independent of the contract and may give 
rise to causes of action in tort." Id. at 800 n.3 
(giving examples). However, in Beck, we 
refused, for a number of policy reasons, see id. 
at 798-801, to recognize a tort action in the 
context of a first-party insurance relationship. 
In the instant case, the court of appeals 
assumed on the basis of Beck that language in 
Thiokors contract calling for a product "free 
from defects" supplanted any independent tort 
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver 
nondefective products or services. See Interwest 
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. But the limitation we 
adopted in Beck is not broadly applicable to all 
contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred 
to a specific relationship between contracting 
parties. Each category of relationships must be 
analyzed to determine, as a matter of law and 
policy, whether in that setting a party to a 
contract owes any tort-type duties to the other 
beyond the duties spelled out in the contract. 
See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 
413, 417-20 '(Utah 1986) (applying analytical 
model for determining whether tort duties exist); 
see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts §92, at 655 (5th ed. 
1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the 
nature of the defendant's activity, (ii) the 
relationship between the parties, and (iii) the 
type of injury or harm threatened to determine 
whether tort obligations are owed in addition to 
contract promises). 
Thiokol cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), as an example of an 
instance where we recognized that a tort duty 
may exist even when the relationship between 
the parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR 
Inc., we allowed a clothing store owner to 
pursue a tort claim against a company which 
agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm 
when the company knew but failed to warn the 
store owner that the alarm could be easily 
deactivated by criminals. Id. at 434. We 
recognized that under those factual 
circumstances, one who undertakes to provide 
services for another owes a tort duty to the other 
to perform such services with reasonable care. 
Id. at 435-37; see Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§323 (1965).2 We explained that a4the 
defendant's tort liability is not based upon 
breach of contract, but rather upon violation of 
the legal duty independently imposed as a result 
of what the defendant undertook to do with 
relation to the plaintiffs interests.'" Id. at 437 
(quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional 
Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions, 
1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 36). 
We agree that a buyer of products or services 
may, in some circumstances, assert tort claims 
along with breach of contract claims against a 
supplier. That recognition is nothing more than 
an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have 
permitted certain actions-for example, products 
liability-to include claims sounding in both tort 
and contract. See Keeton et al., supra, §92, at 
660-61. 
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of 
Thiokors suppliers are necessarily "exactly 
co-extensive with their contractual obligations," 
as the court of appeals held. Interwest Constr., 
886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokol alleged that its 
suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent 
foreseeable harm to others (aegligeace) or 
manufactured and sold the tanks in a defective 
condition that made them unreasonably 
dangerous to others (strict liability). Our 
decision in Beck does not control whether these 
tort claims can coexist with Thiokors contract 
claims. That determination requires a deeper 
analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal, 
that analysis is unnecessary. We will take a 
shorter route and simply assume, without 
deciding, that some tort and contract claims can 
coexist in the instant case. 
In light of this assumption, we also hold that 
the "free from defects" contractual provision 
cited by the court of appeals is insufficient as a 
matter of law to exempt ThiokoFs suppliers 
from strict tort or negligence liability. On 
grounds of public policy, parties to a contract 
may not generally exempt a seller of a product 
from strict tort liability for physical harm to a 
user or consumer unless the exemption term u is 
fairly bargained for and is consistent with the 
policy underlying that [strict tort] liability." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §195(3) 
(19&1). Wmle parties to a contract may 
generally exempt themselves from negligence 
liability, the language they use must "clearly 
and unequivocally' express an intent to limit tort 
liability" in the contract itself. DCR Inc., 663 
P.2d at 438; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §195 cmt. b (1981). Without such an 
expression of intent, aithe presumption is 
against any such intention, and it is not achieved 
by inference or implication from general 
language such as was employed here.'" DCR 
Inc., 663 P.2d at437 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 
(Utah 1965)). 
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Accordingly, we hardly see how a contractual 
promise to provide a product "free from 
defects" amounts to an exemption from tort 
liability, especially when we have refused to 
enforce very detailed and thorough exculpatory 
clauses that presented a much closer case for 
exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at 
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's 
strict liability and negligence claims were not 
precluded by the existence of a contract which 
contained a promise that Interwest and its 
subcontractors would supply products "free from 
defects." We thus disapprove of the reasoning 
employed by the court of appeals to affirm the 
trial court's decision. 
We now address Thiokol's negligence and 
strict liability claims on the merits. "To recover 
for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the 
defendant breached the duty, the breach was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and 
there was in fact injury." Jackson v. Righter, 
891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995); see also 
Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 
1993); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 
(Utah 1991); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1985). To recover on a strict liability 
theory against a seller engaged in selling 
products of the kind at issue, a plaintiff must 
prove (i) that the product was unreasonably 
dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, 
(ii) that the defect existed at the time the product 
was sold, and (iii) that the defective condition 
caused the plaintiff's injuries. Lamb v. B&.B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 
1993); see also Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 
628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 
158 (Utah 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§402A (1965); Keeton et alM supra, §103. 
Assuming, without deciding, that Thiokol's 
suppliers owed it tort duties which they 
breached, it is nonetheless axiomatic that to 
successfully prosecute actions for negligence and 
strict liability, the complaining party must prove 
that another party's breach of duty proximately 
caused the first party's injury. See Jackson, 891 
P.2d at 1392 (negligence); Mulherin, 628 P.2d 
at 1304 (strict liability); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §281 (1965). Proof of 
proximate cause is also required in breach of 
warranty actions, which may sound in either 
contract or tort. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 
697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985); Mulherin, 628 
P.2d at 1304; Hahn, 601 P.2d at 159. 
"Proximate cause is '"that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence!] (unbroken by 
an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one 
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245^46 
(quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 
n.3 OJtah \9UWY 
Applying these principles to the instant case 
and assuming that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort 
duties which they breached, we hold that 
Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same reason 
that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to 
prove that any defect in the design or 
manufacture of tank T33 proximately caused the 
August 24th failure. The trial court specifically 
noted contrary testimony on causation: namely, 
that Fiberglass Structures failed to properly 
design, engineer, manufacture, or test the tanks 
and that these failures contributed to the failure 
of tank T33. However, the trial court ruled 
against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim 
because it found that Thiokol caused the August 
24th failure by overfilling tank T33. We read 
this as a factual determination that Thiokol's 
misuse of tankT33 exceeded the fault, if any, of 
its suppliers. Otherwise, the trial court would 
have apportioned damages on Thiokol's breach 
of warranty claim. See Interwest Constr., 886 
P.2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages 
on Thiokol's breach of warranty claim). 
Accordingly, this finding also defeats 
Thiokol's strict liability and negligence claims, 
because they are premised on the same conduct 
and resulted in the same alleged damages as the 
breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co. 
v. Structo-Ute Eng'g, Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 312 
(Utah 1980). We thus disapprove of the 
reasoning employed by the court of appeals to 
affirm the trial court's ruling but affirm the 
result reached by both courts. 
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court 
of appeals erred in holding that Thiokol waived 
its rights to enforce the terms of its original 
contract with Interwest with respect to the 
repaired tanks. Thiokol insists that its original 
contract with Interwest incorporated the 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69, a national 
voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and 
fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the 
standard, and therefore the contract, called for 
a wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch and a 
safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified 
tanks had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor 
of 6 to l.3 
We first note that the trial court concluded that 
the "NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not 
incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with 
sufficient clarity in the contract for the designer 
and manufacturer to be aware of their 
application; specifically with respect to wall 
thickness and safety factors." 
The court of appeals, in turn, initially 
affirmed the trial court's finding that there was 
no breach of contract because Thiokol's 
suppliers "built and supplied the tanks in 
accordance with the terms of the contract." 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. The court of 
appeals then began its waiver analysis. The 
court first noted, without analysis, that the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall 
thickness dimensions and a safety factor of 10 to 
1 and that the tanks did. not meet these alleged 
requirements. Id. at 97 A nn.6-7. Then the 
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court of appeals concluded that even if the 
contract incorporated the NBS standard, Thiokol 
had waived its right to insist that the tanks 
conform to the wall thickness and safety factor 
the standard allegedly required. Id. at 98. The 
court reasoned that because Thiokol approved 
Fiberglass Structures' proposed design for 
remedying the defective tanks, supervised their 
reconstruction, "and accepted the tanks although 
aware that they were not constructed in 
accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol 
waived its right to claim that the modified tanks 
were deficient because they failed to meet the 
design or construction specifications allegedly 
incorporated into the original contract. Id. 
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals' 
waiver analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny 
because (i) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was a 
material term of the contract which cannot be 
waived; and (ii) an intentional waiver did not 
occur because Thiokol never knew the tanks did 
not meet the NBS/PS 15-69 specifications until 
after the August 24th failure; and (iii) by 
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and 
replace the three tanks after the first failure on 
April 30th, Thiokol was merely permitting that 
supplier to cure its deficient performance, and 
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate 
Thiokors rights to demand full performance 
under the original contract. Thiokol notes that if 
left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver 
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by 
deterring contracting parties from attempting to 
cure defective contract performance. 
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol 
and assumed by the court of appeals that the 
contract incorporated minimum wall thickness 
dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue 
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. 
Thiokol concedes that the trial court expressly 
found that the contract did not incorporate such 
requirements but claims that the court of appeals 
found that it did. Thiokol contends that the court 
of appeals coujd do so because whether the 
original contract incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard presents a question of law which an 
appellate court can correct without giving 
deference to the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. 
However, both Thiokol and the court of 
appeals have misconstrued the issue in this case. 
We do not read the trial court's finding as 
rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard into the contract, but as a finding that 
the standard did not mandate tank walls thicker 
than 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1 so as 
to make these required terms of the contract. 
Our reading is supported by the fact that the 
trial court did consider whether tank T33 met 
NBS/PS 15-69's unambiguous requirement that 
"all layers shall be overlapped a minimum of 1 
inch" but found that Thiokol had not proven the 
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note 
3. 
As we set forth below, under our reading, the 
trial court's finding that the contract's reference 
to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate 
wall thickness or safety factor requirements is a 
factual finding which Thiokol has not properly 
challenged. Thiokol has therefore failed to meet 
its burden on appeal to atmarshal the evidence 
in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous.'" Hall v. 
Process Instruments &. Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 
1024, 1028 (Utah 1995) (quoting A House & 
1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4) (additional 
citation omitted). uAbsent such a showing, we 
'assumeQ that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court and proceed to a review of the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in the case.'" Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting A House & 1.37 
Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4). 
We first clarify the standard of review for 
interpretation of a contract. Determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous presents a 
threshold question of law, which we review for 
correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 
(Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v. 
Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a 
contract is unambiguous, a trial court may 
interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we 
review the court's interpretation for correctness. 
Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation because of 
"uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2dat 
108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is 
found to be ambiguous, a court may consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. Id. 
Determining the meaning of a contract by 
extrinsic evidence generally presents questions 
of fact for the trier of fact, whose findings we 
review deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at 
358; see also Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. 
of State Lands <k Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 
(Utah 1990); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. 
Perillo, Contracts §3-14 (3d ed. 1987). 
Applying the foregoing rules, we first look to 
the four corners of the contract itself to 
determine whether it is ambiguous. We conclude 
that while the contract unambiguously referred 
to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term 
requiring the tanks to conform to the "applicable 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69" made the 
precise meaning of the performance intended by 
the parties ambiguous. * Applicable" is defined 
as tf[f]it, suitable, pertinent, related to, or 
appropriate; capable of being applied." Black's 
Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed. 1990). The word 
"applicable" necessarily implies that (i) all the 
requirements of NBS/PS 15-69 apply; (ii) some 
requirements apply while others do not; or (iii) 
none of the requirements apply. We must 
therefore review the NBS standard to determine 
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whether any of its provisions unambiguously 
mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a 
safety factor of 10 to 1. 
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals 
that the standard does not unambiguously 
mandate a particular wall thickness or safety 
factor for the tanks. The standard spans eighteen 
pages and covers materials, laminate properties, 
round and rectangular ducting, reinforced 
polyester piping, reinforced polyester tanks, 
inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so 
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6 
of the standard states, "(MJinimum wall 
thickness shall be as specified in the tables . . . 
, but in no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 inch 
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating 
conditions." Turning to table 7, which specifies 
minimum wall thicknesses for vertical 
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find 
that the table does not include dimensions for 
tanks greater than 12 feet in diameter, and tanks 
T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in 
diameter. Table 7 also notes that its figures are 
*[b]ased on a safety factor of 10 to 1 . . . and a 
liquid specific gravity of 1.2." The NBS 
standard does not include a formula for 
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different 
sizes than those included in table 7, for different 
safety factors, or for liquids with different 
specific gravities. 
Moreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS 
standard does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1 
safety factor is "the recognized industry" 
standard, contrary to the unsupported assertion 
of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886 
P.2d at 97 n.6, or that this safety factor is 
required in all fiberglass tanks. Other tables in 
the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and flanges 
are based on different safety factors, and we 
have found no formula or recommendation 
regarding selection of a mandatory safety factor. 
Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically 
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as 
merely stating the assumptions upon which its 
wall thickness specifications for standard-sized 
tanks rest. 
In short, the word "applicable" in the 
contract, coupled with the lack of specificity 
within the NBS standard, renders the contract 
ambiguous with respect to the thickness of the 
tank walls and a specific safety factor without 
resort to extrinsic evidence. The trial court 
apparently also found the contract provision 
ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration of 
extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's 
meaning. Whether the standard mandated a 
minimum wall thickness and a safety factor of 
10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial. After 
hearing the evidence, the trial court found as a 
matter of fact that the contract, as drafted by 
Thiokol, did not impose the minimum wall 
thickness and safety factor requirements that 
Thiokol claims were mandated by the NBS/PS 
15-69 standard. 
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual finding before 
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the court of appeals, and so that court should 
have presumed that the trial court's finding was 
correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate 
court does not "'set aside the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence or [the appellate court] otherwise 
reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made."* Sweeney Land Co. v. 
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Western Kane County Special Serv. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). "This standard of 
review applies equally to the Court of Appeals." 
Id.; see also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals court 
should have deferred to the trial court's factual 
finding regarding the meaning of the contract in 
light of its facial ambiguity and should have 
presumed the correctness of the finding, given 
Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on 
appeal. 
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' 
waiver analysis was irrelevant and superfluous 
because it proceeded from an incorrect factual 
assumption. In contrast to the court of appeals, 
the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard did not mandate a minimum wall 
thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a safety factor 
of 10 to 1. A contracting party cannot be said to 
waive a term that was never part of the contract. 
Because the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not 
mandate a particular wall thickness or safety 
factor, Thiokol could not waive these tfterms." 
However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol 
cannot now claim that its suppliers failed to 
adhere to these tfterms" and therefore breached 
their contracts. 
Accordingly, we are left with the trial court's 
factual finding that uthe tanks were built 
pursuant to the design specifications mandated 
by Thiokol in the contract," and the court of 
appeals' affirmance, based on that finding, of 
the trial court's conclusion that there was no 
breach of contract. Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d 
at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of that portion 
of the court of appeals opinion which held that 
Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of 
its original contract with Interwest but affirm 
that court's conclusion that there was no breach 
of contract. 
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with 
Interwest did not preclude Thiokol's claims for 
negligence and strict liability but that those 
claims fail as a matter of law because Thiokol 
caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We 
also hold that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's 
breach of contract claim, because the contract 
provision the court of appeals found Thiokol to 
have waived did not mandate a minimum wall 
thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a 10 to 1 
safety factor as Thiokol claims. However, we 
affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that 
Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract. 
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge 
Harding concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's 
opinion. 
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Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the 
result. 
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon 
does not participate herein; District Judge Ray 
M. Harding sat. 
1. These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court 
of Appeals' opinion in this case. For a more complete 
recitation of the facts, see Interwest Construction v. 
Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 94-95 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, 
granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 
(Utah 1995). 
2. Section 323 of the Restatement provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another which 
he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of the other's person or things, is 
subject to liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's 
reliance upon the undertaking. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). We also 
note that manufacturers and suppliers of products may 
be subject to other tort duties even though then-
products are sold via contract. See id. §§388-90 
(pertaining to suppliers); id. §§395-98 (pertaining to 
manufacturers); id. §402A (pertaining to strict liability 
for defective products). 
3. Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the 
tanks' structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch 
rather than the one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69 
calls for and that the tensile strength of the tanks was 
insufficient. However, the trial court specifically 
rejected this version of the facts, finding that Thiokol 
presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of 
these points. Thiokol failed to challenge the trial 
court's factual findings before the court of appeals. 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 96 ("Thiokol does not 
challenge the trial court's factual findings."). We 
therefore refuse to address them in this opinion. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 
1992). To the extent that the court of appeals recited 
the trial court *s findings incorrectly, see Interwest 
Constr., 886 P.2d at 97 n.7, we vacate that portion of 
its opinion. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo—— 
Interwest Construction, a Utah No. 940616 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
R. Roy Palmer and Val w. Palmer, 
dba A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, 
dba A.H. Palmer & Sons, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass 
Structures Company and Fiberglass 
Structures Company, Inc., 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Fiberglass Structures and Tank 
Company, fka Fiberglass Structures 
Company of St. Paul, Inc.*, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
Thiokol Corporation, F I L E D 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Petitioner. June 14, 1996 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable Gordon R. Low 
Attorneys: Steven D. Crawley, Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake 
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City, for Interwest Construction 
George W. Preston, Logan, and Robert T. Wallace, 
Salt Lake City, for A.H. Palmer & Sons 
John E. Daubney, St. Paul, Minn., for Rysgaard 
and Fiberglass Structures 
Anthony B. Quinn, Mary Anne Q. Wood, Richard G. 
Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for Thiokol 
Mark F. James, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah 
Manufacturers Association 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Following the trial court's entry of judgment on a 
contract dispute in favor of Interwest Construction PInterwest") 
and A.H. Palmer and Sons PPalmer"), Thiokol Corporation 
PThiokol") appealed to this court, and we poured the appeal to 
the court of appeals. We then granted certiorari to review the 
court of appeals' decision affirming the trial court judgment. 
See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1994), 
cert, granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995) , Our present review is limited to considering whether the 
court of appeals erred in holding (i) that our decision in Beck 
v, Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), 
precludes tort actions for negligence and strict liability 
arising out of the breach of contractually defined obligations; 
and (ii) that Thiokol waived its rights to enforce its contract 
with Interwest. 
Thiokol does not appeal the trial court's findings of 
fact. The trial court initially detailed its findings by 
memorandum decision and then by formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Accordingly, we recite the facts in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v. A House & 
1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1994) .f 
In the fall of 1988, Thiokol and Interwest entered into 
a contract under which Interwest agreed to build a wastewater 
treatment facility for Thiokol. Interwest subsequently 
1
 These facts are largely drawn from the Utah Court of 
Appeals' opinion in this case. For a more complete recitation of 
the facts, see Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 94-
95 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted sub nom. Fiberglass v. Thiokol, 
892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). 
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subcontracted with Palmer for labor and materials in connection 
with the construction of the facility. Palmer, in turn, 
subcontracted with Fiberglass Structures and Tank Company, Inc. 
("Fiberglass Structures"), for the purchase of three fiberglass 
wastewater storage tanks for the facility. Palmer's purchase 
order required Fiberglass Structures to follow Thiokol's plans 
and specifications unless it obtained prior approval to deviate 
from them. 
Thiokol's plans and specifications for the treatment 
facility designated the fiberglass tanks as T32, T33, and T34 and 
called for the tanks to be built in accordance with "applicable 
requirements" of NBS/PS 15-69, a national voluntary industry 
standard governing the construction of fiberglass tanks. The 
tanks were designed to collect wastewater from four smaller tanks 
located inside the treatment building by means of a gravity-feed 
system. Because the tanks inside the building were smaller than 
the three external tanks, the gravity-feed system allowed the 
external tanks to become only two-thirds full at maximum. 
Thiokol approved specifications for the tanks indicating that 
their walls would be 1/4 inch thick. 
Fiberglass Structures shipped prefabricated fiberglass 
panels to the treatment facility site. The panels were bolted 
together along vertical seams to create each of the three tanks, 
and the tanks were bolted to a concrete base outside the 
treatment building. The top of each tank was bolted to the 
sides, and fill pipes were connected between the three external 
and the four internal tanks. The three external tanks were 
completed and installed on April 30, 1989. During a trial test 
that same day, tank T34 burst along one of the vertical seams 
connecting two of its fiberglass panels. Nevertheless, on May 2, 
1989, Thiokol inspected the treatment facility and notified 
Interwest that the facility was substantially complete with the 
exception of a few punch-list items, which did not include the 
ruptured tank or necessary repairs to the other two tanks. The 
same day, Palmer gave Thiokol a one-year warranty on all then-
installed work. 
Thiokol hired an independent consulting engineer to 
review the cause of tank T34's failure, and the consultant 
recommended that Thiokol discard all three tanks. The consultant 
was concerned about the strength of the tanks' vertical panels, 
among other things, and recommended increasing the thickness of 
the panels from 1/4 inch, as per the original design, to 3/4 
inch. However, Thiokol's project engineer directed the 
consultant to focus on fixing the tanks' seams. Thereafter, 
Thiokol negotiated separately and directly with Fiberglass 
Structures for the repair of tanks T32 and T33 and replacement of 
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tank T34; Thiokol's involvement was such that the trial court 
concluded that Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures "jointly 
constructed the tanks." Specifications for the modified tanks 
clearly indicated that they would have 1/4-inch-thick walls and a 
safety factor of 6. 
In early June of 1989, Thiokol tested and accepted the 
repaired tanks on the basis of its determination that the tanks 
met its specifications. On June 13th, Fiberglass Structures gave 
Thiokol an extended three-year warranty at Thiokol's insistence, 
which warranted the structural integrity of the tanks but 
expressly excluded damage resulting from modifications to the 
tanks. Interwest and Palmer were minimally, if at all, involved 
in these negotiations. 
In June of 1989, Thiokol began operating the treatment 
facility. Sometime that month, without the knowledge of 
Interwest, Palmer, or Fiberglass Structures, Thiokol changed the 
tanks' filling system from the original gravity-feed design to an 
overhead, high-pressure pump feed. 
On August 24, 1989, tank T33 ruptured, spilling its 
wastewater contents. The trial court found that the pump feed 
system allowed the tank to be overfilled and that tank T33 failed 
because it was overfilled by a Thiokol employee. Given the 
pumping capacity, there was an Insufficient opening at the top of 
the tank to allow for the escape of excess wastewater, thus 
causing an uplift pressure which the tank was not designed to 
withstand. The overfilling and consequent uplift pressure caused 
the tank to lift up from its concrete base and to split from the 
bottom up along the middle of one of the fiberglass panels, not 
along a seam as was the case with tank T34's earlier failure. 
At the time of the second failure, Thiokol withheld 
$200,000 which it owed to Interwest on the original contract. 
That amount included $93,*653.70 which Interwest owed to Palmer. 
The instant action began when Interwest sued Palmer for breach of 
warranty, negligence, indemnity, and breach of contract. Palmer 
then filed a third-party complaint against Fiberglass Structures, 
which in turn filed a third-party complaint against Thiokol. 
Interwest later added Thiokol as a defendant and sought recovery 
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Thiokol eventually 
counterclaimed against Interwest, Palmer, and Fiberglass 
Structures for breach of contract, breach of express and implied 
warranties, negligence, and strict liability. 
After a two-week bench trial, the trial court concluded 
in relevant part that (i) it would not address Thiokol's tort 
claims because the case was "entirely controlled by contract"; 
No. 940616 4 
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(ii) the NBS/PS 15-69 standard was not incorporated into the 
contract so as to specify a particular wall thickness or safety 
factor for the fiberglass panels andf therefore, Thiokol could 
not hold its suppliers liable for failing to provide tanks with a 
specific wall thickness and safety factor; (iii) neither 
Interwest, Palmer, nor Fiberglass Structures failed to comply 
with the contract in any way which caused or resulted in the 
August 24th failure of tank T33; (iv) Thiokol failed to prove the 
cause of tank T33's failure and the most likely cause was 
Thiokol's overfilling the tank; and (v) Thiokol's overfilling the 
tanks barred its recovery under any of its suppliers' warranties. 
Accordingly, the trial court ordered Thiokol to pay Interwest 
$200,000, ordered Interwest to pay Palmer $93,653.70, and 
dismissed all other claims. The court of appeals affirmed, and 
Thiokol's petition to this court followed. 
On certiorari to this court, Thiokol contends that the 
court of appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Thiokol' s 
tort claims. In addition, Thiokol claims the court of appeals 
erred in holding that Thiokol waived its right to assert that the 
modified tanks should have complied with the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard. Thiokol claims that each of these issues presents only 
questions of law which this court should review nondeferentially. 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
We first address the dismissal of Thiokol's tort 
claims. In its post-trial memorandum decision, the trial court 
refused to address Thiokol's negligence and strict liability 
claims because it concluded that the case was "entirely 
controlled by contract." The court of appeals affirmed, 
reasoning that because "the contract expressly provided that 
[Interwest and Palmer] were under a duty to design, construct, 
and deliver a product free from defects and suitable for the 
purposes for which it was to be used," their "responsibility in 
tort is . . . exactly co-extensive with their contractual 
obligations," thus precluding Thiokol's tort claims. Interwest 
Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Thiokol maintains that the court of 
appeals misconstrued our earlier decision in Beck as establishing 
the proposition that "if parties arrange rights, duties, and 
obligations under a contract, any cause of action for breach of 
those contractually defined obligations, rights, or duties lies 
in contract, not in tort." Id^ (citing Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-
800). 
Although we ultimately reach the result that Thiokol's 
tort claims fail, we agree with Thiokol that the court of appeals 
misapplied our holding in Beck. In Beck, we addressed whether an 
insurer's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
allowed its insured to sue the insurer in tort. We held that "in 
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a first-party relationship between an insurer and its insured, 
the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual rather 
than fiduciary." Beck, 701 P.2d at 800. Because we found no 
independent fiduciary duty in the first-party insurance 
relationship, but only a contractual duty to pay claims, we 
further held, ""Without more, a breach of [contractual] implied or 
express duties can give rise only to a cause of action in 
contract, not one in tort*" TH 
Nonetheless, we specifically noted in Beck that *in 
some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also 
result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract 
and may give rise to causes of action in tort." Id. at 800 n.3 
(giving examples)* However, in Beck, we refused, for a number of 
policy reasons, see id. at 798-801, to recognize a tort action In 
the context of a first-party insurance relationship. 
In the instant case, the court of appeals assumed on 
the basis of Beck that language in Thiokol's contract calling for 
a product ™free from defects" supplanted any independent tort 
duties the suppliers might have had to deliver nondefective 
products or services. See Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101* 
But the limitation we adopted in Beck is not broadly applicable 
to all contracts in all circumstances; rather, it referred to a 
specific relationship between contracting parties. Each category 
of relationships must be analyzed to determine, as a matter of 
law and policy, whether in that setting a party to a contract 
owes any tort-type duties to the other beyond the duties spelled 
out in the contract. See, e.g., Beach v. University of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 417-20 (Utah 1986) (applying analytical model for 
determining whether tort duties exist); see also W. Page Keeton 
e t a l #
' Grosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, at 655 (5th 
ed. 1984) (recommending that courts consider (i) the nature of 
the defendant's activity, (ii) the relationship between the 
parties, and (iii) the type of injury or harm threatened to 
determine* whether tort obligations are owed i n addition l:o 
contract promises), 
Thiokol cites DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 
(Utah 1983), as an example of an instance where we recognized 
that a tort duty may exist even when the relationship between the 
parties is founded upon a contract. In DCR Inc., we allowed a 
clothing store owner to pursue a tort claim against a company 
which agreed to install and maintain a burglar alarm when the 
company knew but failed to warn the store owner that the alarm 
could be easily deactivated by criminals. IdL^  at 434. We 
recognized that under those factual circumstances, one who 
undertakes to provide services for another owes a tort duty to 
the other to perform such services with reasonable care. Id. at 
N u 'J 4 0 61 tii 6 
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435-37; see Restatement (SJecond) of Torts § 323 (1965) .2 We 
explained that M*the defendant's tort liability is not based upon 
breach of contract, but rather upon violation of the legal duty 
independently imposed as a result of what the defendant undertook 
to do with relation to the plaintiff's interests•'" Id^ at 437 
(quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in 
the Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 36) . 
We agree that a buyer of products or services may, in 
some circumstances, assert tort claims along with breach of 
contract claims against a supplier. That recognition is nothing 
more than an acknowledgment that virtually all courts have 
permitted certain actions—for example, products liability—to 
include claims sounding in both tort and contract. See Keeton et 
al., supra, § 92, at 660-61. 
We therefore disagree that the tort duties of Thiokol's 
suppliers are necessarily ^exactly co-extensive with their 
contractual obligations," as the court of appeals held. 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. Here, Thiokol alleged that 
its suppliers failed to use reasonable care to prevent 
foreseeable harm to others (negligence) or manufactured and sold 
the tanks in a defective condition that made them unreasonably 
dangerous to others (strict liability). Our decision in Beck 
does not control whether these tort claims can coexist with 
Thiokol's contract claims. That determination requires a deeper 
analysis. But for the purposes of this appeal, that analysis is 
2
 Section 323 of the Restatement provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for 
the protection of the other's person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other 
for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such 
care increases the risk of harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of 
the other's reliance upon the 
undertaking. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) . We also note that 
manufacturers and suppliers of products may be subject to other 
tort duties even though their products are sold via contract. 
See id. §§ 388-90 (pertaining to suppliers); id^ §§ 395-98 
(pertaining to manufacturers); id^ § 402A (pertaining to strict 
liability for defective products). 
No. 940616 
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unnecessary. We will take a shorter route and simply assume, 
without deciding, that some tort and contract claims can coexist 
in the instant case. 
In light of this assumption, we also hold that the 
*free from defects" contractual provision cited by the court of 
appeals is insufficient as a matter of law to exempt Thiokol's 
suppliers from strict tort or negligence liability. On grounds 
of public policy, parties to a contract may not generally exempt 
a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical 
harm to a user or consumer unless the exemption term *is fairly 
bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that 
[strict tort] liability." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 195(3) (1981). While parties to a contract may generally 
exempt themselves from negligence liability, the language they 
use must **clearly and unequivocally' express an intent to limit 
tort liability" in the contract itself. DCR Inc., 663 P.2d at 
438/ see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 cmt. b 
(1981). Without such an expression of intent, *xthe presumption 
is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by 
inference or implication from general language such as was 
employed here.'" DCR Inc., 663 P.2d at 437 (quoting Union Pac. 
R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965)). 
Accordingly, we hardly see how a contractual promise to 
provide a product *free from defects" amounts to an exemption 
from tort liability, especially when we have refused to enforce 
very detailed and thorough exculpatory clauses that presented a 
much closer case for exemption. See Union Pac. R.R., 408 P.2d at 
912-14. We therefore conclude that Thiokol's strict liability 
and negligence claims were not precluded by the existence of a 
contract which contained a promise that Interwest and its 
subcontractors would supply products *free from defects." We 
thus disapprove of the reasoning employed by the court of appeals 
to affirm the trial court's decision. 
We now address Thiokol's negligence and strict 
liability claims on the merits. *To recover for negligence, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, 
the defendant breached the duty, the breach was a proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries, and there was in fact injury." 
Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1392 (Utah 1995); see also 
Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991); Williams v. Melby, 699 
P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). To recover on a strict liability 
theory against a seller engaged in selling products of the kind 
at issue, a plaintiff must prove (i) that the product was 
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, 
(ii) that the defect existed at the time the product was sold, 
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and (iii) that the defective condition caused the plaintiff's 
injuries. Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp,, 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 
1993); see also Mulherin v. Ingersoil-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301/ 
1302 (Utah 1981); Ernest W. Hahnr Inc. v. Armco Steel Co,, 601 
P.2d 152# 158 (Utah 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
(1965); Keeton et al., supra/ § 103, 
Assuming/ without deciding/ that Thiokol's suppliers 
owed it tort duties which they breached/ it is nonetheless 
axiomatic that to successfully prosecute actions for negligence 
and strict liability/ the complaining party must prove that 
another party' s breach of duty proximately caused the first 
party's injury. See Jackson/ 891 P.2d at 1392 (negligence); 
Mulherin# 628 P.2d at 1304 (strict liability); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965). Proof of proximate 
cause is also required in breach of warranty actions/ which may 
sound in either contract or tort. Mitchell v. Pearson Enters./ 
697 P.2d 240/ 247 (Utah 1985); Mulherin/ 628 P.2d at 1304; Hahn# 
601 P.2d at 159. "Proximate cause is **that cause which/ in 
natural and continuous sequence!] (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause)/ produces the injury/ and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury."'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433f 439 
(Utah 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell/ 697 P.2d 
at 245-46 (quoting State v. Lawson/ 688 P.2d 479# 482 n.3 (Utah 
1984))). 
Applying these principles to the instant case and 
assuming that Thiokol's suppliers owed tort duties which they 
breached/ we hold that Thiokol's tort claims fail for the same 
reason that its warranty claim failed: it was unable to prove 
that any defect in the design or manufacture of tank T33 
proximately caused the August 24th failure. The trial court 
specifically noted contrary testimony on causation: namely, that 
Fiberglass Structures failed to properly design, engineer, 
manufacture/ or test the tanks and that these failures 
contributed to the failure of tank T33. However, the trial court 
ruled against Thiokol on its breach of warranty claim because it 
found that Thiokol caused the August 24th failure by overfilling 
tank T33. We read this as a factual determination that Thiokol's 
misuse of tank T33 exceeded the fault/ if any# of its suppliers. 
Otherwise/ the trial court would have apportioned damages on 
Thiokol's breach of warranty claim. See Interwest Constr./ 886 
P.2d at 98-100 (affirming award of no damages on Thiokol's breach 
of warranty claim) • 
Accordingly/ this finding also defeats Thiokol's strict 
liability and negligence claims, because they are premised on the 
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same conduct and resulted in the same alleged damages as the 
breach of warranty claim. Jacobsen Constr. Co* v. Structo-Lite 
Eng'g, Inc./ 619 P.2d 306, 312 (Utah 1980). We thus disapprove 
of the reasoning employed by the court of appeals to affirm the 
trial court's ruling but affirm the result reached by both 
courts. 
We now turn to Thiokol's claim that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Thiokol waived its rights to 
enforce the terms of its original contract with Interwest with 
respect to the repaired tanks. Thiokol insists that its original 
contract with Interwest incorporated the requirements of NBS/PS 
15-69, a national voluntary standard for fiberglass tanks and 
fittings. Thiokol additionally claims that the standard, and 
therefore the contract/ called for a wall thickness greater than 
1/4 inch and a safety factor of 10 to 1, while the modified tanks 
had walls of 1/4 inch and a safety factor of 6 to I.3 
We first note that the trial court concluded that the 
*NBS/PS 15-69 standards were not incorporated into the contract 
by Thiokol with sufficient clarity in the contract for the 
designer and manufacturer to be aware of their application; 
specifically with respect to wall thickness and safety factors." 
The court of appeals, in turn, initially affirmed the 
trial court's finding that there was no breach of contract 
because Thiokol's suppliers *built and supplied the tanks in 
accordance with the terms of the contract." Interwest Constr., 
886 P.2d at 97. The court of appeals then began its waiver 
analysis. The court first noted, without analysis, that the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard imposed minimum wall thickness dimensions 
and a safety factor of 10 to 1 and that the tanks did not meet 
these alleged requirements. Id. at 97 & nn.6-7. Then the court 
3
 Thiokol also claims that the woven roving in the tanks' 
structural laminate layer overlapped by 1/4 inch rather than the 
one-inch overlap that NBS/PS 15-69 calls for and that the tensile 
strength of the tanks was insufficient. However, the trial court 
specifically rejected this version of the facts, finding that 
Thiokol presented inconclusive evidence to prove either of these 
points. Thiokol failed to challenge the trial court's factual 
findings before the court of appeals. Interwest Constr., 886 
P.2d at 96 (^Thiokol does not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings."). We therefore refuse to address them in this 
opinion. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). 
To the extent that the court of appeals recited the trial court's 
findings incorrectly, see Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97 n.7, 
we vacate that portion of its opinion. 
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of appeals concluded that even if the contract incorporated the 
NBS standard, Thiokol had waived its right to insist that the 
tanks conform to the wall thickness and safety factor the 
standard allegedly required. Id, at 98, The court reasoned that 
because Thiokol approved Fiberglass Structures' proposed design 
for remedying the defective tanks, supervised their 
reconstruction, nand accepted the tanks although aware that they 
were not constructed in accordance with NBS/PS 15-69," Thiokol 
waived its right to claim that the modified tanks were deficient 
because they failed to meet the design or construction 
specifications allegedly incorporated into the original contract. 
Id. 
Thiokol argues that the court of appeals' waiver 
analysis cannot survive legal scrutiny because (i) the NBS/PS 15-
69 standard was a material term of the contract which cannot be 
waived; and (ii) an intentional waiver did not occur because 
Thiokol never knew the tanks did not meet the NBS/PS 15-69 
specifications until after the August 24th failure; and (iii) by 
allowing Fiberglass Structures to repair and replace the three 
tanks after the first failure on April 30th, Thiokol was merely 
permitting that supplier to cure its deficient performance, and 
such cure cannot, as a matter of law, abrogate Thiokol's rights 
to demand full performance under the original contract. Thiokol 
notes that if left uncorrected, the court of appeals' waiver 
analysis threatens to encourage litigation by deterring 
contracting parties from attempting to cure defective contract 
performance. 
We reject the premise advanced by Thiokol and assumed 
by the court of appeals that the contract incorporated minimum 
wall thickness dimensions and a 10 to 1 safety factor by virtue 
of the reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. Thiokol concedes 
that the trial court expressly found that the contract did not 
incorporate such requirements but claims that the court of 
appeals found that it di<J. Thiokol contends that the court of 
appeals could do so because whether the original contract 
incorporated the NBS/PS 15-69 standard presents a question of law 
which an appellate court can correct without giving deference to 
the trial court's findings and conclusions. 
However, both Thiokol and the court of appeals have 
misconstrued the issue in this case. We do not read the trial 
court's finding as rejecting the incorporation of the NBS/PS 15-
69 standard into the contract, but as a finding that the standard 
did not mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a safety 
factor of 10 to 1 so as to make these required terms of the 
contract. Our reading is supported by the fact that the trial 
court did consider whether tank T33 met NBS/PS 15-69's 
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unambiguous requirement that *all layers shall be overlapped a 
minimum of 1 inch" but found that Thiokol had not proven the 
existence of insufficient overlap. See supra note 3. 
As we set forth below, under our reading, the trial 
court's finding that the contract's reference to the NBS/PS 15-69 
standard did not mandate wall thickness or safety factor 
requirements is a factual finding which Thiokol has not properly 
challenged, Thiokol has therefore failed to meet its burden on 
appeal to *^marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'" 
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1028 
(Utah 1995) (quoting A House & 1.37 Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4) 
(additional citation omitted). ^Absent such a showing, we 
*assume[] that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceed to a review of the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case,"* Id. (alteration in original) (quoting A House & 1.37 
Acres, 886 P.2d at 538 n.4). 
We first clarify the standard of review for 
interpretation of a contract. Determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous presents a threshold question of law, which we review 
for correctness. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 
356, 358 (Utah 1990). If a contract is unambiguous, a trial 
court may interpret the contract as a matter of law, and we 
review the court's interpretation for correctness. Willard 
Pease, 899 P.2d at 770. "A contract provision is ambiguous if it 
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
"uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292*, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Once a contract is 
found to be ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to 
determine its meaning. Id. Determining the meaning of a 
contract by extrinsic evidence generally presents questions of 
fact for the trier of fact, whose findings we review 
deferentially. Fitzgerald, 793 P.2d at 358; see also Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Pi v. of State Lands & Forestry/ 802 P.2d 720, 
725 (Utah 1990); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts 
§ 3-14 (3d ed. 1987). 
Applying the foregoing rules, we first look to the four 
corners of the contract itself to determine whether it is 
ambiguous. We conclude that while the contract unambiguously 
referred to the NBS/PS 15-69 standard, the term requiring the 
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tanks to conform to the "applicable requirements of NBS/PS 15-69" 
made the precise meaning of the performance intended by the 
parties ambiguous. "Applicable" is defined as "[f]it, suitable, 
pertinent, related to, or appropriate; capable of being applied," 
Black#s Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed, 1990). The word "applicable" 
necessarily implies that (i) all the requirements of NBS/PS 15-69 
apply; (ii) some requirements apply while others do not; or 
(iii) none of the requirements apply. We must therefore review 
the NBS standard to determine whether any of its provisions 
unambiguously mandate tank walls thicker than 1/4 inch and a 
safety factor of 10 to 1. 
Our review of the NBS standard itself reveals that the 
standard does not unambiguously mandate a particular wall 
thickness or safety factor for the tanks. The standard spans 
eighteen pages and covers materials, laminate properties, round 
and rectangular ducting, reinforced polyester piping, reinforced 
polyester tanks, inspection and test procedures, labeling, and so 
forth. As regards wall thickness, section 3.3.6 of the standard 
states, "[M]inimum wall thickness shall be as specified in the 
tables . . . , but in no case shall be less than . . . 3/16 inch 
in pipes and tanks regardless of operating conditions." Turning 
to table 7, which specifies minimum wall thicknesses for vertical 
cylindrical tanks like those at issue here, we find that the 
table does not include dimensions for tanks greater than 12 feet 
in diameter, and tanks T32, T33, and T34 were each 20 feet in 
diameter. Table 7 also notes that its figures are "[biased on a 
safety factor of 10 to 1 . . . and a liquid specific gravity of 
1.2." The NBS standard does not include a formula for 
calculating wall thickness for tanks of different sizes than 
those included in table 7, for different safety factors, or for 
liquids with different specific gravities. 
Mdreover, as regards safety factors, the NBS standard 
does not state anywhere that a 10 to 1 safety factor is "the 
recognized industry" standard, contrary to the unsupported 
assertion of the court of appeals, Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 
97 n.6, or that this safety factor is required in all fiberglass 
tanks. Other tables in the standard for tanks, pipes, ducts, and 
flanges are based on different safety factors, and we have found 
no formula or recommendation regarding selection of a mandatory 
safety factor. Further, we do not read table 7 as specifically 
requiring a safety factor of 10 to 1, but as merely stating the 
assumptions upon which its wall thickness specifications for 
standard-sized tanks rest. 
In short, the word "applicable" in the contract, 
coupled with the lack of specificity within the NBS standard, 
renders the contract ambiguous with respect to the thickness of 
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the tank walls and a specific safety factor without resort to 
extrinsic evidence. The trial court apparently also found the 
contract provision ambiguous, as evidenced by its consideration 
of extrinsic evidence to clarify the contract's meaning. Whether 
the standard mandated a minimum wall thickness and a safety 
factor of 10 to 1 was hotly contested at trial* After hearing 
the evidence, the trial court found as a matter of fact that the 
contract, as drafted by Thiokol, did not impose the minimum wall 
thickness and safety factor requirements that Thiokol claims were 
mandated by the NBS/PS 15-69 standard. 
Thiokol failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's factual finding before the court of appeals, 
and so that court should have presumed that the trial court's 
finding was correct. Hall, 890 P.2d at 1028. An appellate court 
does not *^set aside the trial court's factual findings unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence or [the 
appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Sweeney Land Co. v. 
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990} (quoting Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 
1376, 1377 (Utah 1987)). *This standard of review applies 
equally to the Court of Appeals." Id.; see also Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). In short, the appeals 
court should have deferred to the trial court's factual finding 
regarding the meaning of the contract in light of its facial 
ambiguity and should have presumed the correctness of the 
finding, given Thiokol's failure to properly challenge it on 
appeal. 
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' waiver 
analysis was irrelevant and superfluous because it proceeded from 
an incorrect factual assumption. In contrast to the court of 
appeals, the trial court found that the NBS/PS 15-69 standard did 
not mandate a minimum wall thickness greater than 1/4 inch or a 
safety factor of 10 to 1* A contracting party cannot be said to 
waive a term that was never part of the contract. Because the 
NBS/PS 15-69 standard did not mandate a particular wall thickness 
or safety factor, Thiokol could not waive these *terms." 
However, under the same reasoning, Thiokol cannot now claim that 
its suppliers failed to adhere to these *terms" and therefore 
breached their contracts. 
Accordingly, we are left with the trial court's factual 
finding that *the tanks were built pursuant to the design 
specifications mandated by Thiokol in the contract," and the 
court of appeals' affirmance, based on that finding, of the trial 
court's conclusion that there was no breach of contract. 
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 97. Therefore, we disapprove of 
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that portion of the court of appeals opinion which held that 
Thiokol waived its right to enforce the terms of its original 
contract with Interwest but affirm that court's conclusion that 
there was no breach of contract. 
In sum, we hold that Thiokol's contract with Interwest 
did not preclude Thiokol's claims for negligence and strict 
liability but that those claims fail as a matter of law because 
Thiokol caused the August 24th failure of tank T33. We also hold 
that waiver is inapplicable to Thiokol's breach of contract 
claim, because the contract provision the court of appeals found 
Thiokol to have waived did not mandate a minimum wall thickness 
greater than 1/4 inch or a 10 to 1 safety factor as Thiokol 
claims. However, we affirm that court's ultimate conclusion that 
Thiokol's suppliers did not breach the contract. 
Justice Howe, Justice Durham, and Judge Harding concur 
in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the result. 
Having disqualified himself, Justice Russon does not 
participate herein; District Judge Ray M. Harding sat. 
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Robert F. Babcock (0158) 
Steven D. Crawley (0750) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
254 West 400 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-7000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. ROY PALMER and VAL W. 
PALMER, d.b.a. A. H. PALMER 
& SONS, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No • :_tol 
Plaintiff complains of the Defendant and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation which maintains 
its principal pla<*~ ~^ business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, 
2. Defendants **re residents of Cache County, State of 
Utah. 
3. Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Morton 
Thiokol Inc. ("Thiokol") under which Plaintiff agreed to 
construct a waste water treatment facility (the "Treatment 
Plant") for Thiokol. 
WALSTAD 8L BABCOCK ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW 
' 4. On or about December 1, 1988, Defendants entered 
into a Subcontract Agreement with Plaintiff by which 
Defendants agreed to perform labor and provide materials for 
4
 the construction of the Treatment Plant. A copy of the 
^ Subcontract Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
® incorporated herein. 
' 5. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants 
° supplied, among other things, three fiberglass waste water 
** I storage tanks that were installed in the Treatment Plant. 
6. On or about August 24, 1989 one of the tanks 
supplied by Defendants failed and released approximately 
32,000 gallons of water causing damage to the Treatment 
Plant. 
7. At the time the tank failed an$ at the time of the 
filing of this Complaint, Thiokol was and is indebted to 
Plaintiff an amount exceeding $229,000.00 pursuant to th« 
'^ construction agreement mentioned above of which $93,000.00 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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27 
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was owed to Defendants leaving a balance due Plaintiff of 
19
 $136*, 000.00. 
8. Thiokol "Was refused to pay the balance due to 
Plaintiff because of the damages Thiokol alleges that it 
suffered as a result of the failure of the tank. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of 
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
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'I 10. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants 
2 
are obligated to: 
3 make good without cost to [Thiokol] and 
.. [Plaintiff ] any and all defects due to faulty 
4
 workmanship and or materials which may appear 
within . . . one year from date of completion of 
* L the [Treatment Plant] 
6 I li. Defendants have failed and refused to comply with 
11
 the terms of the express warranty of their work set forth in 
the Subcontract Agreement which has resulted in the 
9 withholding of the payment by Thiokol^ 
'0 12# Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
^ Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
£ I $136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal 
13
 rate from August 24, 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's 
II * * 
^ || c&sts incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
\ j SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
13. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of 
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
° J' 14. Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement Defendants 
are obligated to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from 
any costs, losses or claims that may in any way arise out of 
the Defendants1 performance under the Subcontract Agreement. 
15. Defendants have failed and refused to indemnify 
and hold Plaintiff harmless of loss in accordance with the 
terms of the Subcontract Agreement which has resulted in the 
withholding of the payment by Thiokol. 
1 
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16. P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment aga ins t 
Defendants, j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y , in the amount of 
$136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal 
rate from August 24, 1989 until paid in fu l l and P la in t i f f ' s 
costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees . 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
17. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of 
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
18. Defendants made impliedly warranted that the tank 
was fit for the particular purpose for which it was 
intended. 
19. Defendants breached the implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose by supplying a faulty tank 
and by failing and refusing to replace the faulty tank after 
proper notice of the failure was given to Defendants. 
20. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal 
rate*from August 24, 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's 
costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
21. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of 
this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
22. Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to select a 
competent manufacturer of fiberglass tanks to supply tanks 
for the Treatment Plant. 
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1
 23. Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to adequately 
2 inspect the materials from which the tank was constructed. 
3 24. Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to adequately 
4 supervise the construction of the tank. 
5 25. Defendants negligently performed their duties to 
6 Plaintiff and said negligence was a proximate cause of 
7 Plaintiffs1 damages as alleged herein. 
8 26. As a result of Defendants1 negligence Plaintiff 
9 has suffered damages and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
10 against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
11 $136,000.00, together interest thereon at the highest legal 
12 rate from August 24, 1989 until paid in full and Plaintiff's 
13 costs incurred herein. 
14 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, 
15 jointly and severally, as follows: 
16 1. In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest 
17 thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until 
18 paid in full and Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, 
19 including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the First 
20 Cause of Action; 
21 2. In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest 
22 thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until 
23 paid in full and Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, 
24 including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Second 
25 || Cause of Action; 
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3. In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest 
thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until 
paid in full and Plaintiff's costs incurred herein, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Third 
Cause of Action; 
4. In the amount of $136,000.00, together interest 
thereon at the highest legal rate from August 24, 1989 until 
paid in full and Plaintiff's costs incurred herein pursuant 
to the Fourth Cause of Action; 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems proper. 
DATED this of April, 1990. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Robert F*. Babcock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
2004 North Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
10.compl.134 
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